Showing posts with label apologism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label apologism. Show all posts

Saturday, September 27, 2008

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Excerpt from Anthony Horvath’s
Christian Apologetics Ministry
And the Reclassification of Theism
as the Skeptical Position of Naturalism
"It is not very often that you get an admission as clear as the one that was posted on my forum today. I asserted in this post on my blog that at the bottom, most atheistic arguments against the existence of God are based on the ‘presumption of naturalism’ with [missing info in original post.] The atheist on my forum said:
'At the conclusion, you argue that the evidence will show God’s existence if only we give up our assumption that all explanations must be natural. What you fail to give us is any compelling reason why we must abandon that assumption.'"

Unfortunately, Rev. Horvath's critic undercuts his own position by saying he would, in effect, be willing to accept giving up reason. Horvath responds--quite logically--by saying, "The atheist in question says that this assumption can only be abandoned in the face of extremely good reasons, but it should be evident that anyone who believes ‘all explanations must be natural’ is really just throwing up a smokescreen if he now demands ‘reasons’ for thinking otherwise."

Oh, if only we would listen to what we say before we say it. In light of what Horvath said regarding the abandonment of reason for "compelling" reasons, I think the critic would have thought out his words more carefully.

But my favorite atheist philosopher said we must take men at their word. If they say it, then they said it, and we cannot presume to judge that they meant something else. This does not mean we cannot amend our statement when our contradiction becomes evident.

But unless Horvath's critic writes back, we must assume he does not understand the difference between:

1. A principled deduction of logic that tells him that naturalism is natural, while supernaturalism is---not, by definition, natural; and

2. The decision that it makes no difference whether a thing is "natural" or "not-natural" if one is willing to suspend his rational judgment to decide that the "not-natural" can somehow become the "natural," or at least the "acceptable."

Horvath tells him--and others like him--"If you’re just starting to examine the merits of Christianity and are evaluating skeptical objections, the key here is to understand that all the later objections to things like the resurrection and miracles stem from this prior assumption."

What Horvath himself fails to explain is that naturalism was the prevailing world-view for nearly 1000 years, until Augustine.

There are four goals for the informed naturalist, says physicist and cosmologist Dr. Quentin Smith. "i) retrieve naturalism from its de facto reclassification by medieval philosophers. This is a reclassification (which may have been a result of some other deliberately chosen goal) from its original, accurate, classification in Greco-Roman naturalism, and this reclassification was effected by the medieval philosophers. This reclassification still prevails today." Philo Online http://www.philoonline.org/library/smith_4_2.htm

"Some of these pre-Socratics sometimes used the word “god” (theos), but insofar as the existence of a so-called god or gods was embraced, they meant by “god” a non-human intelligent organism that was a part of and governed by (rather than governing) natural processes. The first task is based on the fact that naturalism began as a distinct, holistic world-view, was in effect subsumed as a skeptical subfield of natural theology by the medievals..."

This means that Christianity was once the "skeptical" position relative to naturalism. Therefore, Horvath's call to critics who may be "evaluating skeptical objections" are not really the skeptics. They are the former progenitors of the original world-view. The problem with modern naturalists assuming this role and attempting to put the Christian back on the skeptical position is that the modern naturalist does not have the proper epistemic tools to do so.

"This retrieval is also a reversal," writes Smith. The aim is that theism be justifiably reclassified as a subfield of naturalism, namely, as a skepticism about the basic principles of naturalism whose refutation serves to stimulate and further develop the naturalist program. 'Philosophy of religion' disappears, to be replaced by a new subfield of naturalism, namely, 'skepticism about naturalism,' with skeptical arguments being put forth and argued against, with the aim in mind of further developing the argumentative foundations of the naturalist world-view."

The informed naturalist must study his logic properly, not just go off on a quick run as a criticism, as Horvath's critic did. Smith outlines his epistemic proposals for creating better arguments than theists, and thus overcoming their "defeater" arguments" with better "defeater" arguments of our own.

Smith lays it out this way:

"A (a defeated justifier). A is the argument that contemporary science and naturalist philosophy are known to be probably or certainly true, even though A includes no counterarguments against contemporary arguments for theism.
DA (a defeater for the justifier A). DA is a sound argument that argument A is unsound.

"B (a defeated justifier). B is an argument that, contemporary science and naturalist philosophy, when conjoined with an evaluation of contemporary theist arguments for not-
N, (where “not-N” implies naturalism is not true) justify not-N.

"DB (a defeater for the justifier B). DB is a sound argument that argument B is unsound.

"C (an undefeated justifier for N). C is the argument that, contemporary science and naturalist philosophy, when conjoined with an evaluation of contemporary theist arguments for not-N, justify N."
Later, after explaining these positions better, he finalizes this portion of his academic paper by advising that :

"Since both A and B are defeated, most contemporary naturalists, as well as most contemporary theists, hold defeated beliefs about the truth-value of naturalism. The informed naturalist knows the complex argument C that constitutes the defeater of B and the justification of N, as well as meets other conditions explained later in this paper.

"[The] Belief State of Informed Naturalists [is]
'C.

'C justifies N.

'Therefore, N is justified.'"

Horvath's critic began with the proper positing of (C), when he said, "At the conclusion, you argue that the evidence will show God’s existence if only we give up our assumption that all explanations must be natural." After that, he provides his own defeater arguments against himself, and all Horvath had to do was properly point them out.

The modern naturalist is not used to using such logic. The modern naturalist is probably not aware that at one time naturalism had Christian logic on the run. The neo-Platonic philosophy of Augustine threw all arguments into disarray, and the naturalists of his day, not used to being put on the skeptical defensive, never recovered.

Smith seems to have discovered the method, the epistemic position, that metaphysical naturalists must take, if we are to regain, one argument by one argument, the former glory position of having not only valid logic, but soundness of logic, on our side.

Because that is what Smith's formula is about: injecting not only validity, in other words adherence to the rules of formal syllogistic logic, but using that logic to locate the soundness. "Soundness" is defined as sound "if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true." The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/val-snd.htm

Thursday, September 25, 2008

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And What Irony To Find This Blog
After Writing About "Existence"
"Before the scientific community came to a consensus on the Big Bang theory following the discovery of the cosmic radiation echo predicted by Big Bang theorists, many scientists believed in the Steady State theory. In short, they believed that the universe had no definite beginning and that hydrogen atoms were randomly popping into existence somewhere in the universe, supplying the material for all the physical phenomena like stars and planets. Atheists were generally rooting for this theory, understanding that a definite beginning for the physical universe implies its contingency- that it has a cause which is outside itself. As it turned out, the Big Bang has been confirmed in great measure by scientific findings...

"How the atheists managed to adopt the Big Bang theory as evidence for their position confounds me. If there is any interesting history behind this, I’d be curious to know it.

"To elaborate further on why this is a philosophical defeat for atheism: The contemporary atheist philosopher Kai Nielsen is frequently quoted by Christian apologists as saying about causation: “Suppose you suddenly hear a loud bang and you ask me, ‘What made that bang?’ and I reply ‘Nothing, it just happened.’ You would not accept that - in fact you would find my reply quite unintelligible.” Nielsen is quite right on this account. Bangs must have causes because they are finite, contingent events that have a definite beginning." W. E. Messamore [blog @] http://www.slaying-dragons.com/

A Reply


"If one thing exists in existence, it becomes the proof of the existence of existence," I wrote, above.
This refutes Messamore on his contention that "hydrogen atoms were randomly popping into existence." The theory of "ex nihilo" has long since been abandoned by Christian theologians; things in existence do not just spontaneously appear. If hydrogen atoms actually were randomly popping into existence, they were caused by something else already in existence. What that is may remain unknown for a long time, if in fact "popping hydrogen atoms" turns out to be a justified theory sometime in the future.
Saying that it was God who caused the popping of hydrogen atoms begs two questions: 1) for what purpose God would cause such a thing, or admitting that no human could ever know that answer; and 2) how can this discussion continue between us if God is the automatic answer to everything?

While I suppose it is true as Messamore says, that "a definite beginning for the physical universe implies its contingency," this in no way implies that metaphysical naturalists believe in the contingency theory, nor that atheists were "rooting" for that theory. I don't remember rooting for it. I don't remember reading that any of my atheist contemporaries or those who came before us rooted for it. But I could be wrong. Maybe some did.

But 'Existence exists' rules out contingency. It is also equally true that 'Existents exist,' and neither statement can be true without the other also being true. The conclusion of the extreme end result of this logic is that existence is not a product--not of a contingency, nor of anything else; and that nothing can be antecedent to existence, because it would require "nothingness" to be the default condition of the universe.Of course every theist is going to defend "nothingness" as the default position, because without doing so there can have been no "creation."

Contingency cannot be a fallback position for creation. "'God' as traditionally defined is a systematic contradiction of every valid metaphysical principle. The point is wider than just the Judeo- Christian concept of God. No argument will get you from this world to a supernatural world. No reason will lead you to a world contradicting this one. No method of inference will enable you to leap from existence to a 'super-existence.'" Leonard Peikoff; "The Philosophy of Objectivism."

Because "nothingness" can not be antecedent to existence, there is "nothing apart from it—and no alternative to it." [Peikoff] If nothingness was antecedent, then "nothingness" is reified, i.e., it becomes an existent. "Nothingness" as an "existent" is contradictory of the terms. "Nothingness" as an antecedent existent necessarily denotes "nothingness" as "something that exists." But just the opposite is true: nothingness is the absence of existence.

To argue that "somethingness" is the absence of "nothingness" reifies absence and makes it an existent. Contradictions do not exist; therefore, reified "nothingness" cannot exist.

The Big Bang was not the beginning of existence, nor by extension of any existents in existence. This means quite simply that the material that exploded in the Bang existed prior to the known universe. But the known materials of the universe are existents, which implies existence, which implies that "nothingness" can not have been the state of existence prior to any creation and that creation cannot have occurred because "nothingness" would then be a reified existent.

When people ask me what caused the Big Bang, I never say, "Nothing." Of course something caused an event. What causes a meteor to slam into the earth? What causes solar flares? The same thing that caused the Bang--which in the most simplistic of terms can only be called the Laws of Existence. But existence did not come about because of an event. It is not a product. It is the primal existential state of all that was, is, or can be. Existence cannot be the primal existential state of "nothingness" because "nothingness" exists only as a conceptual place holder within consciousness that denotes an existential state than cannot exist.

The Law of Identity says "'Everything is what it is and not another thing', or (where 'P' is any proposition) 'If P then P'." Existence, being what it is and not another thing, cannot be not-P, where not-P is "not-existence."

The Law of Non-Contradiction says "No proposition can be both true and not true; or that nothing can be--without qualification--the case and not the case at the same time; or that nothing can--without qualification--both have and lack a given property at the same time." http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/three-laws-of-thought.php So the proposition that "nothingness" is at the same time "somethingness" contradicts this Law.

Why would anyone ever say "nothing" caused the Big Bang? Why would anyone ever say hydrogen atoms just popped into existence from non-existence? They came from somewhere, not from no where; but that "somewhere" was a place in existence, not an "ex nihilo no-place" from which they supernaturally came into Being.

Why would anyone say that existents were created--which creation thus at the same time created existence itself--when the material to use in any creation would have to come from "nothingness?"

Existence is not a "product." Only something supernatural could cause "somethingness" from "nothingness," existence from non-existence; and because this argument relies on something supernatural, metaphysical naturalists must necessarily work from the epistemic principle that "existence exists." CEC

Many thanks to "sntjohnny" http://sntjohnny.com/front/ for turning me on to another Christian apologist. I love debating you guys!